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ABSTRACT
Although Canada’s migrant labour program is seen by some as a model of best
practices, rights shortfalls and exploitation of workers are well documented. Through
migration policy, federal authorities determine who can hire migrant workers, and the
conditions under which they are employed, through the provision of work permits.
Despite its authority over work permits, the federal government has historically had little
to do with the regulation of working conditions. In 2015, the federal government
introduced a new regulatory enforcement system - unique internationally for its attempt
to enforce migrants’ workplace rights through federal migration policy - under which
employers must comply with contractual employment terms, uphold provincial
workplace standards, and make efforts to maintain a workplace free of abuse. Drawing
on enforcement data, and frontline law and policy documents, we critically assess the
new enforcement system, concluding that it holds both promise and peril for migrant
workers.

* Authorship is listed alphabetically to reflect equal contribution.
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Canada is home to a longstanding and expansive temporary migrant worker program.
Migrant workers 1 in Canada provide essential labour in response to “labour shortages,”
including in key occupations and sectors unattractive to native-born workers and
permanent residents on the terms and conditions employers offer. As observed by
Sharma, the concept of “labour shortage” is qualitative: the demand is not for labour
generally, but specifically for labour in conditions and for rates of pay that Canadian
citizens and permanent residents will not accept. 2 Industries with a high proportion of
migrant workers include agriculture, caregiving and domestic work, retail, and
construction.
Canada's federal government regulates migrant labour through immigration law and
policy, under which state authorities determine who can hire migrant workers, and the
conditions under which they may be employed, by way of granting permission to
employers to hire migrant workers and granting work permits to the workers
themselves.
Elements of Canada’s migrant work programs are often touted as "best practice"
examples. 3 Yet worker exploitation and rights shortfalls are well documented within
various components of Canada’s migrant labour programs. Evidence suggests that
exploitation is most acute among those engaged in low-skilled jobs, tied partly to the
dirty, dangerous, and demeaning work they perform (e.g., agricultural workers and
caregivers). 4 Some such exploitive practices violate applicable legislated minimum
standards that are primarily regulated by provincial/territorial law. These include
employment standards (e.g., minimum wage, overtime etc.), occupational health and
safety regulation (e.g., the provision of proper safety equipment), and human rights
(e.g., non-discrimination on the basis of gender, race/ethnicity). Other rights shortfalls
arise from a failure to fulfil the terms attached to the closed work permit (e.g., the work
not being performed for the employer specified, the work being of a different nature than
that described in the initial job offer). These shortfalls are amplified by the limited labour
1

In what follows, we use the term “migrant worker” to refer in general to workers in Canada without
permanent residency status. In principle, this group includes undocumented workers, but because our
study is focused on documented workers, the term has this more limited meaning herein. Documented
migrant workers enter Canada under two programs: the Temporary Foreign Worker Program (TFWP) and
the International Mobility Program (IMP). We refer to workers in the TFWP as TFWs. All TFWs fall within
the inspection program. Only some workers migrating under the IMP (those requiring closed work
permits) fall within the ambit of the program. Our focus is TFWs but, where appropriate, we indicate when
we are also referring to covered IMP workers.
2 NANDITA SHARMA, HOME ECONOMICS: NATIONALISM AND THE MAKING OF “MIGRANT W ORKERS” IN CANADA
133 (2006).
3
Hennebry, Jenna L., and Kerry Preibisch. "A model for managed migration? Re‐examining best
practices in Canada’s seasonal agricultural worker program." International Migration 50 (2012): e19-e40.
4 See Sedef Arat-Koc, ‘Good Enough to Work but Not Good Enough to Stay’: Foreign Domestic Workers
and the Law, in LOCATING LAW : RACE/CLASS/GENDER CONNECTIONS 125, (Elizabeth Comack ed., 1999);
Tanya Basok, Free to Be Unfree: Mexican Guest Workers in Canada, 32 LAB. CAP. & SOC’Y 192, (1999);
Jenna Hennebry, Permanently Temporary? Agricultural Migrant Workers and Their Integration in Canada,
26 INST. FOR RES. ON PUB. POL’Y (2012), https://irpp.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/research/diversityimmigration-and-integration/permanently-temporary/IRPP-Study-no26.pdf; Kerry Preibisch, Pick-YourOwn Labor: Migrant Workers and Flexibility in Canadian Agriculture, 44 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 404, (2010).
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mobility and deportability of temporary foreign workers (TFWs), conditions that create
structures of vulnerability and unfreedom and make voicing complaints particularly
risky. 5
Despite evidence of these challenges and the manner in which legal and policy
structures serve to entrench migrant worker vulnerability, the federal government has
historically had little to do with the regulation of working conditions for migrant workers.
Rather, employment standards, occupational health and safety, and human rights fall
largely within provincial/territorial authority. Migrant workers are covered by these laws,
but their deportability, limited labour mobility, and the prevalence of complaint-based
systems for redress tend to limit their enforcement. So, while the federal immigration
system created structures of vulnerability, historically the government has disclaimed
responsibility for addressing the resulting labour rights violations and instead exercised
its powers solely to protect Canadian jobs and the domestic labour market. 6
The government’s refusal to exercise its powers for the protection of migrant workers
began to change in 2011 with the introduction of a very limited employer compliance
review process. However, it was only in 2015 that the federal government created an
enforcement regime that, for the first time, required employers to comply with basic
labour standards and the terms of migrant workers’ contracts as a condition of hiring
migrant workers.
Like Canada’s labour migration program, the federal enforcement system may come to
be considered externally, including by other states, as a model policy for protecting
migrant workers. With this in mind, we provide the first analysis of this new system. We
draw on program statistics, federal enforcement data and operational policy materials
we obtained through freedom of information requests, alongside legislation, regulations,
and case law to provide a comprehensive view of the regulatory structure and the policy
by which frontline officers interpret and apply the new system. We evaluate the federal
enforcement system, taking into account an extensive enforcement literature on the
efficacy of different styles of regulatory enforcement systems for securing meaningful
employer compliance with labour standards, as well as the particular vulnerabilities that
result from migrant workers’ precarious immigration status. We conclude that the
extreme compliance orientation and practice of federal enforcement, in conjunction with
other design flaws, undermine the protective potential of the new system.

5

On the migrant workers’ condition of unfreedom, see Todd Gordon, Capitalism, Neoliberalism, and
Unfree Labour, CRITICAL SOC. (2018); ROBERT MILES, CAPITALISM AND UNFREE LABOUR: ANOMALY OR
NECESSITY (1987).
6 Bridget Anderson, Migration, Immigration Controls and the Fashioning of Precarious Workers, 24 W ORK
EMP. AND SOC’Y. 300 (2010); Mimi Zou, The Legal Construction of Hyper-Dependence and HyperPrecarity in Migrant Work Relations, 31 INT’L J. COMP. LAB. & INDUS. REL. 141 (2015); Chris F. Wright et
al., Employer-Sponsored Temporary Labour Migration Schemes in Australia, Canada and Sweden:
Enhancing Efficiency, Compromising Fairness?, 43 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 1185 (2017).
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The Significance of Temporary Migration in Canada: Patterns and Trends
As within the OECD overall, Canada’s migration policy has seen a movement away
from the post-World War II orientation of permanent immigration towards temporary
migration for employment. 7 Indeed, from 2009 to the present, total temporary migration
for employment grew steadily, with the number of temporary work permits for work
purposes (i.e., excluding refugees and people awaiting permanent status) exceeding
admissions to permanent residency for economic reasons. 8 Just over 300,000
(302,821) temporary migrant workers signed permits in 2017 (up from 116,540 in 2000),
but Canada granted permanent status to just 159,262 (economic class) immigrants that
year (up from 136,287 in 2000); temporary migrants thus went from representing 46% to
66% of total economic migrants between 2000 and 2017. 9
Non-residents wishing to work in Canada are required to obtain work permits that fall
into two broad categories (see Figure 1 below). In the first category, permits are issued
under the Temporary Foreign Worker Program (TFWP). These permits cover positions
for which a Labour Market Impact Assessment (LMIA) is required. All of these permits
limit the worker to working for a specific employer, for a specified time period, in a
named role. They are often described as “closed” or “bonded” work permits, as the
worker is not authorized to work in any other position, or for any other employer, than
those listed on their permit. These permits are potentially available to any employer and
for any type of work, provided the employer can meet a labour market test. Historically,
however, the largest groups of workers have been in agricultural and domestic work
pursuant to specific sub-programs of the TFWP.10 In order to change employers, the
prospective new employer must obtain another LMIA, which is an employer-initiated
7

ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION OUTLOOK
2018 25-7 (2018); see also Salimah Valiani, The Shifting Landscape of Contemporary Canadian
Immigration Policy: The Rise of Temporary Migration and Employer-Driven Immigration, in PRODUCING
AND NEGOTIATING NON-CITIZENSHIP: PRECARIOUS LEGAL STATUS IN CANADA 55 (Luin Goldring & Patricia
Landolt eds., 2013).
8 IMMIGRATION, REFUGEES AND CITIZENSHIP CANADA, FACTS AND FIGURES 2016: IMMIGRATION OVERVIEW –
PERMANENT RESIDENTS (2016), http://www.cic.gc.ca/opendata-donneesouvertes/data/Facts_and_Figures_
2016_PR_EN.pdf; IMMIGRATION, REFUGEES AND CITIZENSHIP , CANADA, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT TO
PARLIAMENT ON IMMIGRATION (2018),
https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/ircc/migration/ircc/english/pdf/pub/annual-report-2018.pdf (On an
annual basis, Canada admits tens of thousands of immigrants as permanent residents under family and
humanitarian classes. However, the majority of permanent residents arriving annually enter under the
‘Economic Class’. These migrants receive permanent residency on such bases as their skill level,
occupation, and/or financial investments. Permanent residents migrating on economic grounds are
nevertheless being outpaced by those on temporary work permits).
9 See infra Figure 1; LEAH F. VOSKO, DISRUPTING DEPORTABILITY: TRANSNATIONAL W ORKERS ORGANIZE
tbl.A.3. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019).
10 One stream within the TFWP is designed specifically for caregivers who, unlike other workers in this
stream, are given a pathway to permanent residency. Recently, the government announced it planned to
provide caregivers with sectoral rather than employer specific permits. IMMIGRATION, REFUGEES AND
CITIZENSHIP CANADA, News Release: Caregivers Will Now Have Access to New Pathways to Permanent
Residence (Feb. 23, 2019), https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugeescitizenship/news/2019/02/caregivers-will-now-have-access-to-new-pathways-to-permanentresidence.html
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process, beyond the control of the worker. These workers are covered by the new
enforcement system under the jurisdiction of ESDC that forms the focus of our study. 11
The second broad category of temporary work permits fall within the International
Mobility Program (IMP), which is comprised of those entering Canada pursuant to
international agreements, working holidaymakers, spouses of high-skilled workers, and
post-graduates work permit holders, among other groups. Unlike the TFWP, employers
do not need to obtain an LMIA in order to hire a worker under the IMP. Most migrant
workers entering under IMP sub-programs that have open work permits and are not
subject to an inspection system. However, approximately one-third of those participating
in the IMP hold closed work permits, tied to a single employer, a specific occupation,
and a location. 12 This group is subject to an inspection system parallel to that covering
the TFWP, but enforced by IRCC rather than ESDC. 13
Figure 1: Canada's Migrant Worker Programs: Labour Market Tests and Types of
Work Permits
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11

Employment and Social Development Canada, previously known as Human Resources and Skills
Development Canada
12 Regulations Amending the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations: Regulatory Impact
Analysis Statement, 152 CAN. GAZETTE 2 (2018), http://www.gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p1/2018/2018-1215/html/reg1-eng.html.
13 Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR 2002-227 § 209.2(1) (Can.) [hereinafter IRPR].
IRCC was formerly known as Citizenship and Immigration Canada (“CIC”).
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Figure 2: Temporary Work Permit Holders for Work Purposes*, 2005-2017
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The total number of IMP participants almost tripled between 2005 and 2017 whereas
the number of TFWP participants declined precipitously from 2013 to 2017, after
stabilizing at high levels between 2007 to 2013 (Figure 2).
Despite the growth of the IMP, TFWs, and the inspection system that governs their
employment, are the principal focus here given the magnitude of evidence of the
vulnerability of TFWs and also that a highly precarious subset (i.e., those in agriculture)
is growing. 14 On the other hand, migrant workers participating in the IMP are a
heterogeneous group, with different degrees of vulnerability that are difficult to
document. 15
The Federal Enforcement System
Sources of Labour Rights for Migrant Workers: Connecting Federal Immigration
Powers to Provincial/Territorial Jurisdiction over Protective Standards

14

Leah Vosko, Eric Tucker and Rebecca Casey, “Enforcing Employment Standards for Migrant
Agricultural Workers in Ontario, Canada: Exposing Underexplored Layers of Vulnerability” 35
International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 227 (2019); Vosko, surpa. note
9.
15 For a preliminary discussion and case study of one group of IMPs, see Eric Tucker, Migrant Workers
and Fissured Workforces: CS Wind and the Dilemmas of Organizing Intra-Company Transfers in Canada,
ECON. & INDUS. DEMOCRACY (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1177%2F0143831X17707822.
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The new enforcement system takes its place in the context of multiple, sometimes
overlapping, sources of workplace rights for migrant workers, shaped in part by the
division of powers in Canada’s federalist system. Under the Canadian constitution, the
federal government exercises paramount jurisdiction over immigration. 16 Labour and
employment law is largely a matter of provincial or territorial jurisdiction, and applies to
the overwhelming majority of migrant workers, although there are significant barriers to
meaningful protection for migrant workers under these laws. 17 Paramount federal
jurisdiction over immigration does not empower the federal government to override
provincial or territorial jurisdiction over labour and employment. However, the federal
government’s immigration jurisdiction does allow it to set conditions for employers who
hire migrant workers that must be included in an offer of employment. These terms may
be more generous than minimum standards established by applicable workplace laws
but may not be lower. Immigration law thus provides migrant workers with a further
source of workplace rights, which was underutilized until the implementation of the new
enforcement system.
Two federal agencies are directly involved in regulating migrant labour: ESDC, and
IRCC. ESDC provides permission to employers to hire migrant workers through Labour
Market Impact Assessments (LMIA). To obtain an LMIA, the employer must show that
hiring a migrant worker will have a neutral or positive impact on the Canadian labour
market. 18 In making this determination, ESDC officers must consider whether or not:
• there is a labour shortage
• hiring the migrant worker will create or maintain jobs or skills transfer for
Canadians and permanent residents
• the wage is consistent with the “prevailing wage” for that job. 19

16 The Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Victoria, c 3, s. 95. Provincial governments have recently
assumed a more active role in the selection of immigrants, but not in the enforcement of immigration
regulations. For a discussion, see Mireille Paquet, The Federalization of Immigration and Integration in
Canada, 47 Canadian Journal of Political Science (2014) and Sasha Baglay and Delphine Nakache,
“Immigration Federalism in Canada: Provincial and Territorial Nominee Programs (PTNPs) in Baglay and
Nakache, eds., Immigration Regulation in Federal States, (Netherlands: Springer, 2014), 95-116. While
limitations of space and scope inhibit us from providing an analysis of the relationship between
Indigenous sovereignty and Canadian law here, it nevertheless bears mentioning that Canadian
immigration law was developed as a fundamental component of territorial and cultural colonization. Like
much of Canada’s legal system, its development is linked to the dispossession, murder, violence, and
forced assimilation of Indigenous peoples. Indigenous legal systems exist throughout the territory
claimed by Canada, and serious questions exist as to the legitimacy of the Canadian state to exert control
over this territory, particularly in those parts neither ceded nor subject to treaty; see, e.g., Amar Bhatia,
We Are All Here to Stay: Indigeneity, Migration, and Decolonizing the Treaty Right to Be Here, 31
W INDSOR YEARBOOK ACCESS JUST. (2013); Soma Chatterjee, Immigration, Anti-Racism, and Indigenous
Self-Determination: Towards a Comprehensive Analysis of the Contemporary Settler Colonial, SOC.
IDENTITIES 1 (2018); Laura Madokoro, On Future Research Directions: Temporality and Permanency in
the Study of Migration and Settler Colonialism in Canada, 17 HIST. COMPASS (2019).
17 Federal jurisdiction over labour and employment is limited to only 6-10% of Canada’s private sector
labour force and few migrant workers are employed in the federally regulated sector.
18 IRPR, supra note 13, § 203.
19 Id. § 203(3)(d).
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Once an employer obtains a positive LMIA, it may make an offer of employment to a
migrant worker, who may then apply for a work permit from IRCC. The offer of
employment must describe the job duties, rate of pay, and working conditions, as
approved in the LMIA. An employer’s failure to provide wages and working conditions
that are substantially the same as – but not less favourable than – those laid out in the
offer constitutes non-compliance with the employers’ obligations under immigration law.
Until recently, the federal power to regulate the employers of migrant workers was used
solely for protectionist purposes to impose conditions restricting the employment of
migrant workers, and not for protective purposes to prevent or remediate abusive
treatment of migrant workers. The new system requires employers not only to meet the
terms of LMIAs, but also to comply with applicable workplace laws, and make
reasonable efforts to provide an abuse free workplace. The latter two obligations
created new federally enforceable workplace rights not previously found in LMIAs. 20
Beyond the use of regulations, it bears mentioning that the federal government has also
created workplace rights for a subset of migrant workers through bilateral agreements
regulating the longstanding Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program (SAWP) and
providing for employment contracts which must meet minimum provincial standards.
These contracts per se do not form part of the enforcement system under study, nor are
they subject to its inspection powers, but agricultural workers are covered by the new
enforcement system as a subset of migrant workers under the overall TFW program to
which the new system applies.
To summarize, TFWs have several overlapping sources of labour rights:
•

•

Labour and Employment Law
o Provincial/Territorial labour and employment laws including both statutory
and judge-made (common) law (or the federal government’s laws for
those employed in the federal jurisdiction)
Immigration Law (federal)
o The terms of the positive LMIA and offer of employment, which may not be
inferior to legislated employment standards;
o The right to have their employer make reasonable efforts to provide an
abuse-free workplace (from the IRPR);
o For SAWPs, the standard contract arising from interstate agreements and
MOUs, which may add to, but may not derogate from, legislated minimum
standards.

This brings us to the question of enforcement. In Canada’s federalist arrangement,
provinces/territories have exclusive jurisdiction over the enforcement of their laws. That
labour standards apply to TFWs does not give federal officials authority to enforce them
directly. However, because immigration regulations now require employers to comply
20

IRPR, supra note 13, § 209.3(1)(a)(v).
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with provincial standards, in principle ESDC has the power to treat the violation of
provincial standards as immigration law violations and take enforcement action. In
contrast, when LMIAs and interstate agreements create labour rights above the
statutory floor, provincial officials cannot enforce them; they are only enforceable by
immigration officials and/or in court.
As noted, notwithstanding its immigration powers, Canada’s federal government has
long shirked responsibility for enforcing workplace standards with regard to migrant
workers. However, against the backdrop of a series of reports of employer abuse, in the
2010s enforcement initiatives took shape at this level. Indeed, in 2011 law and policy
changed to grant ESDC and IRCC the power to actively review employers of migrant
workers. This change led to the introduction of paper-based Employer Compliance
Reviews (ECRs) that resulted in few employers facing sanctions. In 2015, the federal
government implemented a further set of regulatory changes, creating much broader
enforcement and inspection powers for ESDC in its role as the first gatekeeper of the
TFWP. 21 This enforcement system is the central object of this analysis.
While our inquiry is concerned primarily with the enforcement of labour rights, or the
protective role, this system also enforces the terms of LMIAs that restrict migrant
workers’ labour market freedom so that they can only be employed in the same
occupational category, location and business for which their employer received an
LMIA. The scheme is thus designed both to enforce the protectionist restrictions that
construct migrant workers’ juridical unfreedom and the protective standards that aim to
shield migrant workers from the labour rights violations and workplace abuse that they
experience disproportionately because of their unfree status. 22 In the next section, we
examine in detail the powers and procedures under the new enforcement system,
followed by an analysis of its frontline application in terms of its potential to provide
protection to workers.

Powers and Procedures under the New Federal Enforcement System
The 2015 amendments to the IRPR created new inspection and enforcement powers to
regulate the employers of a large number of migrant workers. Here, we discuss how
inspections are triggered, the scope of investigative powers, employer justifications and
employer sanctions. We then examine the policy that guides the frontline application of
these new powers and the case law that defines the scope of protection. Finally, we
engage in a critical assessment of the inspection system.

Inspection Triggers

21

A parallel enforcement system by the IRCC was created to enforce the closed work permits and
workplace rights of workers in the IMP with closed work permits.
22 See Gordon, supra. note 5 and MILES, supra. note 5.
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Federal inspections under the new system may be triggered in three circumstances: a)
where an officer has “reason to suspect” that the employer has not complied with the
conditions described above; 23 b) where the employer has not complied with those
conditions in the past; and c) as part of a random verification of compliance. 24 ESDC’s
policy manual on inspections (henceforth “the Inspections manual”) elaborates on
these. With regard to “reason to suspect”, the manual lists multiple sources of
information, including tips from the public (ESDC operates a “tip line”), other federal
sources, non-governmental organizations (including unions), provincial/territorial
government agencies, and the media. 25
ESDC reviews all intelligence on the basis of relevance, credibility, and impact and
assigns an intelligence score, or “I-score.” In the case of known past non-compliance,
the Inspections manual indicates that an employer may be selected for inspection at the
discretion of staff and based on the nature and severity of the infraction. Random
selection is generated using an algorithm whose model aims to provide representative
samples and sorting by region, sector, and occupational type. 26

Investigators’ Powers and Duties and Employer Justifications
Once an inspection is triggered, the new regulations empower officers (in the case of
ESDC, Integrity Services Investigators, henceforth “investigators”) to exercise broad
powers to gather information, in contrast to the previous compliance system, which was
narrow, paper-based and focused primarily on information provided by the employer.
However, under the new system, an inspection does not require an onsite investigation.
To the contrary, the Inspections manual makes it clear that an onsite visit is optional. 27
The manual specifies when an onsite inspection is required (to ensure worker safety; to
verify conditions if required, and to limit employer misrepresentation)28 and implies that
the investigator will consult with the Team Leader prior to determining that one is
required. 29 Although the regulations themselves allow for extensive onsite inspections,
paper-based inspections remain implicitly framed as the norm, and onsite inspections
the exception. Maintaining the centrality of paper-based inspections represents an
under-utilization of the enforcement potential of the new regulations, and signals a
compliance orientation at the frontline policy level.
The Inspections manual articulates a set of principles to guide the conduct of
inspections. The first principle is that investigators are to “[b]e remedial, rather than
adversarial: work with employers during the inspection to educate them about their
23

Id. § 209.3(1).
Id. § 209.5.
25 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT CANADA, INTEGRITY OPERATIONS MANUAL: CHAPTER 63B –
TEMPORARY FOREIGN W ORKER PROGRAM – INSPECTIONS, § 9.1 (2018) [hereinafter INSPECTIONS MANUAL]
(provided in response to a request under the Access to Information Act).
26 Id. § 9.1-3.
27 Id. § 11.8.
28 Id.
29 Id. § 11.9.
24
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responsibilities under the IRPR and assist them to comply with TFWP conditions.”30
Other principles involve transparency, being unbiased and applying the “precautionary
principle” to prevent causing avoidable harm and the “newspaper test” to establish
whether an enforcement action, if publicized, would be judged ethical.
To support an onsite or paper-based inspection, investigators can compel employers to
provide documentation and to report for questioning. Without a warrant, they can enter
workplaces (for private residences, warrants are required), examine anything on the
premises, make recordings, and require employers to show electronic records. 31 The
requirement to comply with investigators is imposed on all employers as a condition of
hiring migrant workers, 32 and the employer bears the burden of proof to show that it is
compliant. 33
On finding that an employer has breached the regulatory conditions, the investigator
must provide a “notice of preliminary finding” to the employer, to which the employer
has 30 days to respond, for example, by contesting the alleged facts or providing a
justification for the breach. 34 The regulation lists seven acceptable justifications. These
include a change in federal or provincial law; an error in interpretation made in good
faith (with compensation); an unintentional accounting or administrative error (with
compensation); and force majeure. 35 If the employer does not provide an acceptable
justification, the employer is non–compliant and liable to sanctions. Despite the
generality of these justifications, in Obeid Farms, the Federal Court held:
[T]he justification provisions must be strictly interpreted. The intention of
Parliament in enacting these provisions was to prevent abuse of highly vulnerable
temporary foreign workers, given the tenuous circumstances of their employment
which lack the normal safeguards preventing abuse otherwise available to most
Canadian workers. 36
Below, we examine how strictly investigators interpret these justifications in the field in
terms of inspections and outcomes. 37

30

Id. § 5.
IRPR, supra note 13, §§ 209.6-209.9.
32 Id. § 209.4.
33 INSPECTIONS MANUAL, supra note 25, § 11.10.
34 Id. § 15; IRPR, supra note 13, §§ 209.993-209.994.
35 IRPR, supra note 13, §§ 209.3(3), 203(1.1).
36 Obeid Farms v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Social Development), [2017] F.C. 302, para. 31
(Can.).
37 It bears noting that the Inspections Manual provides that where an investigator has accepted a
justification from a noncompliant employer, a similar justification in similar circumstances should generally
not be accepted a second time, unless the employer can show “legitimate reasons” for so doing; see
INSPECTIONS MANUAL, supra note 25, § 6.
31
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Types of Outcomes and Penalties
Inspection outcomes are classified as either “satisfactory,” “satisfactory with
justification,” “satisfactory with justification and compensation,” or “non-compliant.” 38 If
the investigator is satisfied that the breach occurred and was not justified, the
investigator is to document the situation and make a recommendation to the program
area. 39 An official in the program area will make the final decision and, if they agree with
the investigator’s recommendation, the area officer will issue a notice of final
determination, including any monetary penalties and a ban on hiring migrant workers, if
applicable.
Penalties are calculated according to a formula set out in the regulations, which
accounts for frequency and severity of violations and represents the employer’s noncompliance as a number of points. It is possible in this system for an employer to
receive only 0 or 1 point, in which case a warning will be issued. Two or more points
will result in a monetary penalty, publication of the employer’s name on a website
hosted by IRCC listing noncompliant employers, and the employer may also be banned
from hiring migrant workers temporarily or permanently. 40
This approach to punishment draws on principles and practices common in other
licensing regimes, such as drivers’ licenses or, in the United Kingdom, gangmasters’
licenses, in which the accumulation of points can eventually result in the loss of the
license. 41 The adoption of this approach is not surprising since, as we noted above, the
LMIA regime effectively operates as a licensing scheme for employers wishing to hire
migrant workers in the TFWP that provides employers with permission to hire TFWs
under specified conditions.
Unlike most other labour inspection regimes in Canada (i.e., provincially, territorially,
and in the federally-regulated private sector), investigators cannot issue compliance
orders. One would, therefore, expect that a finding of non-compliance would result in
employer penalties. However, indicative of a deeply compliance-oriented model of
enforcement, the Inspections manual states that investigators should instead work with
employers to bring them into compliance rather taking a deterrent approach. 42 It
provides that in addition to “conducting investigations” and “validating compliance”, the
investigator “[d]etermines non-compliance and identifies corrective measures” and
“[w]orks with employers in [an] effort [sic] to achieve compliance when non-compliance
was determined” 43 In short, in the absence of a power to issue compliance orders, the

38

EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT CANADA, POLICY: EMPLOYER INSPECTION AND DETERMINATION OF
CONSEQUENCES, 20 (2018) [hereinafter CONSEQUENCES GUIDELINE] (provided in response to a request
under the Access to Information Act); INSPECTIONS MANUAL, supra note 25, § 12.
39 INSPECTIONS MANUAL, supra note 25, § 12.
40 Id. §§ 209.98 – 209.997, sched. 2; CONSEQUENCES GUIDELINE, supra note 38 at 26.
41 Catherine Barnard, Amy Ludlow & Sarah Fraser Butlin, Beyond Employment Tribunals: Enforcement of
Employment Rights by EU-8 Migrant Workers, 47 INDUS. L.J. 226 (2018).
42 Id. § 8.
43 Id. at 17.
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manual directs investigators to negotiate compliance as a first response to a finding of
non-compliance. As we demonstrate below, penalties are rarely imposed.

Frontline Policy Directions Regarding Protective Labour Rights
As noted above, the federal enforcement system includes three protective obligations:
compliance with the terms of the offer of employment; compliance with applicable labour
and recruitment laws; and, the duty to take reasonable steps to provide an abuse-free
workplace. Before turning to the practice of enforcement, however, we highlight a few
key directions that govern inspection practices.
Non-Compliance with the Offer of Employment
Offers of employment must describe the job duties and stipulate wages and other
working conditions such as hours of work. Employers cannot provide pay or working
conditions less favourable than those set out in the offer, LMIA letter, and annexes. 44
According to policy, employers cannot substitute one condition for another. For
example, the employer cannot substitute increased compensation for health insurance if
the job offer/LMIA included a requirement to provide health insurance. Where noncompliance is detected, employers may offer any of the justifications permitted in the
regulations. 45
The manual contains specific instructions for inspections of workplaces employing
migrant agricultural workers, whose rights are governed in large part by the federal
National Commodities list and a standard form contract. Notably, inspectors are
directed to defer to housing inspectors with regard to onsite worker housing, and not to
assess pesticide use directly, relying instead on employers’ paperwork. 46

Compliance with Applicable Federal and Provincial/Territorial Laws
The Inspections manual lists examples of the laws covered by this obligation, including
employment standards, workers’ compensation, occupational health and safety, and
laws designed to protect foreign nationals. The list does not include collective
bargaining or human rights laws, both of which clearly apply to, and protect the rights of,
employees. 47 Therefore, these laws should be listed, since they are covered by
regulation. The failure to do so may, in practice, result in their being overlooked by
inspectors.

44

IRPR, supra note 13, § 209.3(1)(iv).
Id. § 11.17.iii.
46 INSPECTIONS MANUAL, supra note 25, app. C.
47 INSPECTIONS MANUAL, supra note 25, § 11.17.vi.
45
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This manual makes clear that investigators may consider present and past compliance,
going back six years. 48 Although the employer ostensibly bears the burden of proving
compliance, in the absence of proof of non-compliance, the employer will generally be
found not in violation. 49 Moreover, federal inspectors do not independently determine
whether an employer has violated workplace law. Rather, they are only to determine
whether the employer has been found in violation by the federal/provincial/territorial
authority primarily responsible for the law’s enforcement. 50 The federal enforcement
system, therefore, does not increase the likelihood that violators will be detected; rather,
it creates additional potential liabilities for employers caught violating applicable
statutory labour rights. As a result, the enforcement of workplace laws under the
inspection system is only as good as those primary enforcement regimes.

Failure to Make Reasonable Efforts to Provide A Workplace Free of Abuse
The third requirement that pertains directly to working conditions is that employers
“make reasonable efforts to provide a workplace that is free of abuse.” 51 The regulations
define “abuse” as follows:
For the purpose of this Part abuse consists of any of the following:
(a) physical abuse, including assault and forcible confinement;
(b) sexual abuse, including sexual contact without consent;
(c) psychological abuse, including threats and intimidation; and
(d) financial abuse, including fraud and extortion. 52
The policy manual stipulates that when ESDC “receives information indicating that a
TFWP employer or one of their employees have been accused of committing or found
to have been convicted of abuse-related crimes, that employer will be Inspected…to
determine whether reasonable efforts have been made to provide a workplace free of
abuse.” 53 This formulation seems to suggest that the trigger for an inspection is a
criminal accusation or conviction. However, the manual later states that "[a]ll TFWP
related allegations of abuse received by ESDC/FC are reviewed and assessed," and the
manual recognizes that investigators may discover that this type of abuse has occurred
during a regular inspection. 54
“Reasonable efforts” is not a defined term in the regulations, but the inspections policy
gives a list of criteria to determine whether reasonable efforts have been made, namely:
-The employer had made general efforts to prevent workplace abuse
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Id. § 14.12.
Id. § 11.17.vi.
50 Id. § 5.4. Id. § 11.17.vi.
51 IRPR, supra note 13, § 209.3(1)(a)(v).
52 Id. § 196.2.
53 INSPECTIONS MANUAL, supra note 25, § 14.10.
54 Id. § 14.10.iii.
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-The employer, or anyone in a supervisory role or acting on the employer’s
behalf, has not actively participated in abuse, including failing to stop abuse of
which they had knowledge; and
-Where an allegation or incident of abuse occurred, steps were taken by the
employer to address abuse and prevent it from happening again 55
As with other sections of the manual, the “elements to assess” section of the policy
manual has been redacted. However, the manual does give examples of how an
employer could prove compliance with this requirement, including showing their abusefree policies and procedures, demonstrating their efforts to inform and educate
employees of the policies and procedures, and demonstrating their ongoing
commitment to provide a work environment that is free from abuse and violence. The
manual also states that policies may vary, and smaller employers may have no specific
policies at all. Nevertheless, all employers “must make efforts to treat employees,
including TFWs, in a fair and abuse free manner and to take steps to provide a work
environment that is free of abuse and violence” 56 (italics in original).
The manual informs inspectors about what to expect from employers after an actual
incident of abuse. In such a case, the employer is required to provide “a high-level
description of a process” that includes an assessment of the facts, support measures for
the victim, referral of the allegation to the relevant authority, action taken by the
employer in response, and follow up. 57 None of the materials we obtained provide
guidance on how to assess employer justification with regard to a finding that it failed to
make “reasonable efforts to maintain a workplace free of abuse.”
The Consequences guideline suggests a more direct role for investigators where there
is an allegation, incident, or reasonable concern that abuse may have occurred. 58 For
example, although investigators do not have authority to inspect workers’ bodies, they
are directed to look for signs of physical confinement or abuse, such as “bruises, blood,
and intimidated workers.” 59 In regard to sexual abuse, they should look for signs such
as “intimate relations between workers or between workers and management, erotic
literature, photographs and/or websites, in the workplace, trafficking in persons….” 60
The policy also discusses when the employer will be considered actively responsible for
the abuse, including where the employer or its agent has directly abused a worker,
where “it is more likely than not” that the employer or its agent directed, encouraged, or
supported abuse, where there is evidence that the employer protected the abuser, and
where the employer has placed an employee who has been convicted of abuse in
contact with a migrant worker. 61
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Id. § 14.10.ii.
57 Id. § 14.10.iv.
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59 Id. at 15.
60 Id.
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Either way, the regulation is concerned with the issue of whether the employer has
made “reasonable efforts”, not with whether it has succeeded in providing an abuse-free
workplace. The requirement for employers to make reasonable efforts to provide a
workplace free of abuse has also been considered by the Federal Court in Obeid
Farms. 62 In that case, the Minister found the employer to be non-compliant on multiple
grounds, including failing to make reasonable efforts to provide a workplace free of
abuse. In reviewing this decision, the Federal Court quashed it with regard to the
breach of the “reasonable efforts” requirement. The Federal Court noted that the
investigator’s report erroneously described the requirement as being “to provide a
workplace that is free of abuse,” noting that this “is quite different than whether the
employer ‘made reasonable efforts to provide a workplace that is free of abuse.’” 63
While the Court rejected the employer’s argument that there must be evidence of actual
abuse to support a finding of “no reasonable efforts,” 64 it also found that here there was
no evidence to show the workplace was “not free of abuse,” and concluded that the
investigator’s finding was unsupported for this reason. 65
It follows that an investigator does not have to make a finding that abuse occurred, it
being sufficient that the employer failed to make reasonable efforts to prevent abuse. In
the absence of evidence that abuse has occurred, the manual directs investigators to
consider various indicators of the employer’s preventive efforts. 66 Yet in Obeid, the court
held that if the employer does not have any policies in place, this does not mean that
the employer’s efforts to provide an abuse free workplace were not reasonable. The
court explained:
Reasonableness is a highly, and indeed, almost entirely contextual standard…
Evidence of reasonableness often is based on the norms of other persons in
similar circumstances… The court’s sense is that other small farming TFW
employers might have interpreted this provision in a similar fashion, not really
knowing what the requirement really entailed other than assuring no abuse was
occurring. 67
We consider the impact of these confusing directions on the enforcement of the
“reasonable efforts” requirement below.

The Practice of Enforcement: Inspections and Outcomes
To examine the practice of enforcement, we obtained statistics from EDSC on
inspection and outcomes. Tables 1 and 2 make it clear that when the inspection
program started, paper-based reviews were by far the most frequent. Even in 2016-17,
62

Obeid Farms, supra note 36.
Id. para 54.
64 Id. para 53.
65 Id. para 55.
66 IRPR, supra note 13, §§ 209.2(4), 209.3(4).
67 Obeid Farms, supra note 36, para. 56.
63

16

only 111 onsite inspections were completed out of a total of 3666 inspections, or about
3%. Onsite inspections, however, became more frequent in subsequent years. In
2017-18, about 30% of completed inspections were onsite, while in 2018-19 (part year),
around 55% were onsite.
The shift from paper reviews to onsite inspections has been accompanied by fewer
completed inspections annually. In 2016-17, 3666 inspections were completed, but in
2017-18 the number dropped to 2,888 and for 2018-19 only 867 inspections were
completed at the end of six months, so that if this trend continues, there will be fewer
than 2000 for 2018-2019.
Table 1
ESDC Overall Inspections and Outcomes, 2016-17 to 2018-19
Overall inspections
Inspections

2016-2017

2017-2018

2018-2019 (September 30, 2018)

Inspections underway

0

2,805

2,987

Onsite inspections
underway

0

1,297

616

Paper reviews underway

0

1,508

3,666

2,888

867

Onsite inspections
completed

111

851

474

Paper reviews completed

3,438

2,037

Employer correction

784

1,317

392

Non-compliant

1

32

16

Non-compliant pending decision (2year ban)

0

21

16

Non-compliant pending decision
(AMPs and BANs)

0

33

0

Inspections completed

Source: ESDC, Access to Information Request, A-2018-02770

In terms of inspection results, Table 2 divides completed inspections into the four
categories of satisfactory, compliant with intervention, non-compliant, and awaiting final
adjudication. ESDC considers “compliant with intervention” identical to “satisfactory
with justification/restitution" found in the Inspections manual. Therefore, we must
assume that investigators who have determined non-compliance to which employers
responded with sufficient justification have reported these as satisfactory or satisfactory
with justification (compliant with intervention).
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Table 2
ESDC Results from Completed Inspections, On-site and Paper-Based, by Year,
2015-16 to 2017-18
Results from Completed Inspections and Reviews by Year
On-site inspections

Paper Based Reviews

2015-16

2016-17

2017-18

2015-16

2016-17

2017-18

Satisfactory

0

47

391

731

1,884

1,031

Compliant
with
Intervention

2

31

427

1,015

1,222

890

NonCompliant

0

1

8

140

54

18

Awaiting
Final
Adjudication

2

32

9

1,551

278

94

Total

4

111

835

3,437

3,438

2,033

Source: ESDC, Access to Information Request A-2018-02770

Over the three complete years for which we have data (2015-16 to 2017-18), the most
frequent outcome was satisfactory (about 40%) followed by compliant with intervention
(about 36%), awaiting final adjudication (about 20%), and non-compliant (about 4%)
(Table 3).
We can also calculate the percentage of employers who were found non-compliant in
the first instance by adding together the categories “non-compliant” and “compliant with
intervention” and divide that by the number of completed inspections less those awaiting
final adjudication. The result is that nearly 50% of employers were found to be noncompliant in the first instance. However, about 90% of the employers found to be noncompliant offered a justification (with restitution when required) that was accepted by
the investigator. Only 10% of employers found non-compliant in the first instance were
ultimately cited as non-compliant (361 out of 3948) (Table 3).
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Table 3
Outcomes of Completed Inspections, By Inspection Type and Totals, 2015/16 to
2017/18
Satisfactory
Compliant with
Intervention
Non-Compliant
Awaiting Adjudication

Onsite: Number (%)
438 (46%)
460 (48%)

Paper: Number (%)
3646 (40%)
3127 (35%)

Total: Number (%)
4044 (40%)
3587 (36%)

9 (1%)
352 (4%)
361 (4%)
43 (5%)
1923 (21%)
1966 (20%)
950 (100%)
9048 (100%)
9998 (100%)
Source: ESDC, Access to Information Request A-2018-02770 (Calculated from Table 2)

Unfortunately, data are not available on the reasons why employers were found noncompliant in the first instance. This is an important lacuna since it prevents us from
determining the extent to which inspections are targeting the protective aspects of the
regulations or the protectionist ones. We also do not have data specifying the accepted
justifications in cases of initial non-compliance. These too, are important, since their
analysis would allow us to better understand how this supposedly narrow exception is
being interpreted so that it excuses 90% of the non-compliance detected in the first
instance.
The overall results differ by type of inspection and year. Looking at type of inspection,
the most frequent outcome for onsite inspections is compliant with intervention (about
48%), followed by satisfactory (46%), awaiting final adjudication (5%) and noncompliant (1%). For paper inspections, the most frequent outcome is satisfactory
(about 40%), compliant with intervention (35%), awaiting adjudication (21%) and noncompliant (4%). In either case, if we leave aside awaiting adjudication, which is an
indeterminate outcome, a very small fraction of inspected employers is found to be noncompliant (about 4%), although that outcome is more frequent for paper than for onsite
inspections.
If we look at the data over time, we see that the rate of employers found to be noncompliant (excluding those awaiting adjudication) has been steady at 1% of those
subject to onsite inspections but has varied among those subject to paper inspections
(7% in 2015-16, 17% in 2016-17 and 9% in 2017-18).
The Canadian government maintains a public list of non-compliant employers, which as
of 17 April 2019 contained 149 names. The list is compiled from both ESDC (TFWs)
and IRCC (IMP) inspections and includes employers who were found non-compliant
under the ECR review process. Our analysis of IRCC enforcement data from 2015-16
to 2017-18 shows that a total of 17 employers were found non-compliant. Therefore,
we can assume that the great majority of employers listed as non-compliant are from
ESDC inspections or ECR reviews. The list of non-compliant employers partially
illuminates the reasons for the finding of non-compliance. In 53 of the 149 cases, no
reason is provided because the non-compliance occurred before the new regulations
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came into force in December, 2015. These 53 employers were found non-compliant
under the pre-2015 process. That leaves 96 employers who were found non-compliant
on inspection and for whom we have reasons.
In some cases, employers were found to be non-compliant for more than one reason
and so the total number of reasons given (122 – Table 4) exceeds the number of noncompliant employers. Table 5 identifies the reasons by year by the numerical key,
which corresponds with the relevant section of the regulation. For ease of analysis, we
divided these reasons into categories. Administrative reasons include such things as
failing to keep or provide an investigator with requested documents or failing to attend a
meeting or inspection. LMIA enforcement refers to the enforcement of provisions
related to the protectivist requirements such as those related to the job description or
related to creating new jobs or improved skills for Canadians. Unfortunately,
compliance with LMIA conditions blends protection and protectivist concerns; thus, it is
impossible to know whether employers were found non-compliant for a workplace rights
violation or for failing to employ the migrant worker in the job described in the LMIA.
The non-compliance list provides several interesting insights. First, the number of
employers who were found non-compliant under the enforcement system increased
dramatically in 2019 (Table 6). This increase does not mean that more non-compliance
has been detected in 2019, however, since 2019 is the year of decision, not the year of
violation, and a great many employers (40) were added to the non-compliance list in
January of 2019. Thus, we cannot tell whether the increase in 2019 reflects a resolution
of some kind of bureaucratic glitch in processing cases or an increase over time in the
number of employers being found non-compliant.
In the overwhelming majority of cases where non-compliance is detected in the first
instance, the outcome is “compliant with intervention.” This finding strongly suggests
that investigators are encouraged to secure compliance and to use sanctions only when
employers are not cooperative. The prominence of employer justifications in reported
outcomes also provides evidence of a compliance orientation. These include good faith
errors or unintentional actions where compensation is provided to workers. In addition,
where employers have been found non-compliant with regard to administrative
obligations, such as record keeping, employers can justify the violation by showing that
they made all reasonable efforts to comply. 68 Investigators imbued with a compliance
orientation will likely be open to accepting these kinds of justifications for noncompliance notwithstanding the judicial pronouncement, in Obeid, that justifications
should be strictly construed. The ESDC data strongly suggest that justifications are
readily accepted – as noted above, 90% of employers who are found to be noncompliant in the first instance provide justifications deemed acceptable. 69
68

IRPR, supra note 13, §§ 209.2(4), 209.3(4).
IRCC inspection data covering the three years from 2015-16 to 2017-18 show that of the 1353
inspections, employers were found compliant “with justification” only 14% of the time, while only about 1%
were found non-compliant. About 85% were found to be compliant (IRCC data). The enormous
differences between ESDC and IRCC outcomes for compliant and compliant with justification raises a
question about how investigators in each scheme are recording inspection outcomes.
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With regard to the reasons why employers are found non-compliant, Table 6 shows that
nearly half of the reasons given relate to administrative matters (70), the most common
by far being the failure to provide the investigator with requested documents.
Violations of the protectionist, restrictive conditions of the LMIA is a reason given in for a
finding of non-compliance 11 times, but the number is probably larger if we assume that
some proportion of the “working conditions or job description” category relates to noncompliance with the job description. The fact that the most common reason for
employers being cited for non-compliance is that they failed to provide the investigator
with documents, or some other administrative reason, rather than a substantive labour
rights violation further supports the conclusion that the enforcement system is heavily
compliance oriented. Non-cooperation with the investigator is the offence that is taken
most seriously.
Only one employer has been found non-compliant because of its failure to comply with
applicable protective employment laws. This is not a surprising result since, as we
noted earlier, federal investigators do not make an independent determination of
whether a violation has occurred but depend on the provincial/territorial authorities with
primary enforcement jurisdiction and studies have shown that statutory labour rights are
poorly enforced generally, and that enforcement for precariously employed workers, and
TFWs in particular, is especially fraught. 70 In effect, then, the federal enforcement
system, which was called into existence in large measure because of the failure of
primary enforcement to protect migrant workers against rights’ violations, has been
implemented to make it structurally dependent on the flawed enforcement system it is
supposed to ameliorate.
With regard to the duty to make reasonable efforts to provide an abuse-free workplace,
no employers are reported here for non-compliance. However, as discussed earlier,
while one employer, Obeid Farms, was found to be in violation of this requirement, that
finding was overturned by the Federal Court. It is not surprising that in the judgment’s
aftermath investigators have not cited employers for failing to make reasonable efforts,
since the absence of any positive efforts by the employer to prevent abuse does not
provide a sufficient basis for finding the employer failed to make reasonable efforts. In
effect, the court has made the positive duty to take reasonable efforts unenforceable,
and instead transformed the provision into a due diligence defence that an employer
can raise if there is a finding that abuse occurred. “But I made reasonable efforts….”.
The court implicitly recognized this result and invited the Minister to consider whether it
would be advisable to make it clear what proactive measures were expected of
employers, but to date no action has been taken. 71
Finally, we do not know how many employers have been cited for not complying with
their duty to provide working conditions at least as favourable as those stipulated in the
70
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71 Obeid Farms, supra note 36, para. 59.
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LMIA because the category has been melded with the job description issue. The
number is somewhere between zero and forty (Table 5).
Table 4
Reasons for Finding of Non-Compliance by Year of Decision and Regulatory Key
Year of
Decision

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

Total
Reasons
Given
67

2019 (to 4 3 0 1 1 43 0 0 11 0
0
0
0
0
4
0
0
17.04)
2018
3 0 0 1 1 7 1 1 12 0
0
0
0
0
4
0
0
30
2017
2 1 0 1 0 3 0 0 17 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
24
2016
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Total
9 4 0 3 2 54 1 1 40 0
0
0
0
0
8
0
0
122
Source: Government of Canada, Immigration and Citizenship, “Employers who have been non-compliant”
Online at https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/work-canada/employersnon-compliant.html (Accessed 17 April 2019); for an explanation of rows 1017, see Appendix: Regulatory
Key.

Table 5
Reasons for Finding of Non-Compliance by Year of Decision and Type of
Violation
Year of
Decision

Administrative
Reason
(1,2,5,6,7)

LMIA
Enforcement
(4,11,12,13,
14,15)

Applicable
Workplace
Law (8)

2019 (to
51
5
17.04)
2018
12
5
2017
6
1
2016
1
0
Total
70
11
Source: Calculated by authors based on Table 4

AbuseFree
Workplace
(17)

0

0

Working
Conditions
or Job
Description
(9)
11

1
0
0
1

0
0
0
0

12
17
0
40

Live-InCaregiver
(3, 10,16)

Total
Reasons
Given

0

67

0
0
0
0

30
24
1
122
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Table 6
Penalties Imposed on Non-Compliant Employers by Year of Decision

Year of Final
Decision

Total # of NonNumber of
Number of
Number of
Compliant
Employers Fined
Employers
Employers Fined
Employers
Suspended
and Suspended
(Number NonComplaint with
ECR)
2019 (to 17.04)
54 (3)
51
3
0
2018
47 (23)
22
24
1
2017
46 (26)
19
26
1
2016
2 (1)
1
1
0
Total
149 (53)
93
54
2
Source: Government of Canada, Immigration and Citizenship, “Employers who have been non-compliant”
Online at https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/work-canada/employersnon-compliant.html (Accessed 17 April 2019)

In terms of consequences, 54 employers were suspended from the program, in most
cases for two years. 72 Suspensions were more common in the first years of the
program, when more than half of non-compliant employers were suspended from the
program. Thus far, only three suspensions have been imposed in 2019, suggesting
there has been a marked change in approach. When employers are fined, the level of
the fine is usually low, in the $1000 to $3000 range. One company, Kameron Coal in
Nova Scotia, was fined $54,000 (and received a one-year suspension) but that was truly
exceptional. The next highest fine is for $16,000, imposed on two companies, Harbour
Sushi in BC and Mozza Vera Foods in Quebec. Below these the next highest fines are
$4000 or less.
A possible reason for the low rate of penalties and citations for non-compliance is that
the enforcement system lacks resources to detect non-compliant employers.
Restricting ourselves to TFW inspections by ESDC, there were 3,666 completed paperbased and on-site inspections in 2016/17. 73 How likely was it that an employer with a
TFW would be inspected? Unfortunately, this likelihood is not easy to calculate from the
published data. We know that in 2016, about 16,000 employers received positive
LMIAs, some for multiple workers. 74 However, the data do not include employers who
use personal names, (e.g., persons who hire caregivers or who use personal names in
their business), which eliminates tens of thousands of employers from the list. As well,
the data includes employers who received a positive LMIA but did not hire at least one
TFW. Nevertheless, we can crudely estimate that an employer who hired a TFW in
2016/17 had about a one-in-four chance of being inspected, a figure that is extremely
high compared to the odds of being inspected in other labour inspection programs, such
72
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as the ESA in Ontario. 75 This finding suggests that resource limitations are probably not
the primary reason for light-touch enforcement in the federal enforcement system.
A more likely explanation is that the government has opted for the compliance model
out of choice, not necessity. In a compliance model, it is assumed that most employers
are well-intentioned and law abiding and that when they do violate the law it is the result
of ignorance or incompetence. Therefore, the primary goal of an enforcement system is
to provide compliance assistance, for example, by providing employers with information
about their obligations and advice about how to comply. Where non-compliance is
detected, it need not be recorded officially so long as the employer agrees to comply in
the future and, if necessary, makes restitution to employees who have been adversely
affected by the non-compliance. Moreover, even when non-compliance is recorded,
deterrence measures like administrative monetary penalties or suspension from the
program are be a last resort.
Unless we assume that nearly all employers under the federal inspection program are
complying with applicable employment and recruitment laws and are making reasonable
efforts to provide abuse-free workplaces (a conclusion that would be at odds with
evidence documenting rights shortfalls and exploitation of migrant workers), we must
conclude that the inspection system is failing to protect workers against these rights
violations in many instances.
Another potential shortcoming of this system is that if employers have their LMIAs
revoked, TFWs are at risk of being deported unless they can find another employer who
has, or can obtain, an LMIA. There is nothing in the present regulations to provide a
remedy for migrant workers in the TFWP who lose their jobs and eventually, their
migration status as a result of sanctions against employers. However, one subset of
such workers may benefit from a recent regulatory change. As of summer 2019,
workers with legal status can obtain open work permits if they can demonstrate that
they are “at risk of abuse.” 76 While in principle this might encourage TFWs to report
abuse, given the insecurity of migrant workers and their focus on maximizing their
earnings during the limited time they have in the Canadian labour market, as well as the
general compliance orientation of the enforcement system, we doubt much will change.
In the following section we discuss the policy implications of these results.

Discussion
The federal enforcement system, makes it a condition of hiring migrant workers that
employers comply with basic labour standards and the terms of migrant workers’
contracts, as well as requiring employers to make “reasonable efforts” to ensure
75
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workplaces are free of abuse. The system is promising insofar as it seeks to respond to
a widely acknowledged rights shortfalls, and integrates labour standards into federal
regulatory control of labour migration, but its protective potential of the inspection
system is not being reached. A major reason for this is that the government has
adopted an extreme version of the compliance model of enforcement in which it is
assumed that rights violations are the result of employer ignorance and incompetence.
As a result, when violations are detected, penalties rarely follow, provided that
employers do not defy the inspectors’ authority and make restitution when required.
Despite research that challenges the efficacy of this model of enforcement, it is widely
used in protective labour law enforcement.
Our data show that employers are rarely cited for non-compliance for violations of
migrant workers’ workplace rights. The results of inspections, whether paper-based or
onsite, confirm that non-compliance with the terms of LMIAs, violations of statutory
labour rights and failures to take reasonable measures to prevent abuse are
widespread. Despite the fact that nearly half of all inspected employers are noncompliant in the first instance, very few employers are cited for non-compliance and
punished. Rather, most non-compliance is excused on the basis of employer
justification and payment of compensation where applicable.
The compliance orientation of this new system echoes a long history of enforcement
officers in Canadian jurisdictions defaulting to extreme compliance orientations in the
absence of strong leadership pushing for a greater use of enforcement powers. 77
Studies of the enforcement of other statutory labour rights, such as the ESA, contradict
the assumptions on which the compliance model is built and thus raise serious
concerns about the efficacy of the compliance-based approaches. 78 Researchers have
found that complaint driven enforcement systems are ineffective at identifying and
addressing violations, especially if they depend primarily on employee complaints. 79
This is because workers who experience violations may be reluctant to complain.
Complaint-based regimes are particularly unsuitable for vulnerable workers who may
not know their rights and, more importantly, may be afraid to exercise their voice due to
fear of retaliation, notwithstanding that retaliation is unlawful. 80 Research has shown
that even when migrant workers do not face deportation, they are less willing to
complain than their peers. 81 For TFWs the stakes are even higher, because job loss
could result in deportation. 82 Insofar as this enforcement system is complaint-driven,
77 Eric Tucker et al., Making or Administering Law and Policy: Discretion and Judgement in Employment
Standards Enforcement in Ontario, 31 CAN. J.L. & SOC’Y 65 (2016).
78 John Grundy et al., The Enforcement of Ontario’s Employment Standards Act: The Impact of Reforms,
43 CAN. PUB. POL’Y 190 (2017); Leah F. Vosko et al., The Compliance Model of Employment Standards
Enforcement: An Evidence-based Assessment of its Efficacy in Instances of Wage Theft, 48 INDUS.
RELATIONS J. 256 (2017).
79 D. Weil & A. Pyles, Why complain? Complaints, Compliance, and the Problem of Enforcement in the
U.S. Workplace, 27 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 59, (2006).
80 Vosko, supra note 70.
81 Barnard, supra note 41 at 241-46.
82 Sarah Marsden, Enforcing Exclusion: Precarious Migrants and the Law in Canada (Vancouver, UBC
Press, 2018).
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some of the risks may be mitigated if arrangements are made to receive complaints
from multiple sources, including members of the public, TFWP stakeholders, foreign
diplomatic channels, NGOs, etc.
The extreme compliance orientation of the federal government is exacerbated by its
interaction with the primary enforcement of protective labour laws by provincial/territorial
governments. Given the well-documented barriers migrant workers face in accessing
provincial employment standards remedies, and the fact that such remedies are not
always well designed to account for the particular vulnerabilities confronting migrant
workers, any effective federal system should respond to these weaknesses. In this
regard, however, the federal system also fails. Federal investigators are only authorized
to take action after provincial authorities have found non-compliance and so they add no
additional resources to the detection of violations. At best, the threat of federal
enforcement raises the potential consequences for those caught violating statutory
labour rights.
Finally, the current judicial interpretation of the requirement to make reasonable efforts
to prevent workplace abuse renders this provision ineffective. In the absence of a
finding of actual abuse, it appears almost impossible to hold an employer non-compliant
for failing to make reasonable efforts to prevent it. In effect, the “make reasonable
efforts” provision does not impose a meaningful duty on employers to take positive
proactive measures, but rather provides employers with a due diligence defence in the
event abuse occurs.
Arguably the most logical results-driven response to the exploitation of migrant workers
is to change the structures of vulnerability that enhance their risk. Replacing employertied, time-limited work permits with open work permits and/or pathways to permanency
for migrants providing necessary labour would do much to resolve these issues.
Furthermore, migration status security would likely reduce migrant workers’ reluctance
to use existing rights mechanisms. Failing structural change of this order, our
conclusions also support proactive communication between provincial and federal
authorities, the use of risk-sensitive selection of employers for inspection which do not
rely on complaints, and deterrence, rather than compliance-based policies.

Conclusion
It is well documented that Canada’s TFW program creates structures of vulnerability
that produce rights shortfalls for migrant workers. Rather than address those structures,
the federal government opted to create an enforcement system to better protect migrant
workers from rights violations. As we have documented, the adoption of an extreme
compliance model of enforcement, in conjunction with the limited ability of federal
inspectors to detect violations of employment laws and the virtual elimination of the
employer’s proactive duty to take reasonable measures to prevent workplace abuse,
have prevented the system from achieving its potential.
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